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LEGISLATION
information to the members of each constituent, as the statute permits
the appearance of "any interested person" to show cause why the
application should not be granted. Sufficient information concerning
the status and nature of all constituent corporations and the pres-
ence of these corporations before the tribunal will permit the ap-
proval, modification or disapproval to be predicated on facts and




Broadly speaking, any delegation of authority to perform an act
may come within the definition of a proxy.' However, the term
as used in law generally has specific reference to the right to vote
conferred upon another by a record shareholder in a stock corpora-
tion. At common law, in the absence of special authorization, a share-
holder had to vote in person or not at all; the right of voting by
proxy was unknown.2 The nationwide dispersion of the stockholders
of "big" or "listed" corporations clearly called for some convenient
form of absentee voting so that the policies of these corporations could
be expeditiously executed.3 To satisfy this need, made urgent by
modern business demands, many states, including New York,4 have
enacted statutes expressly authorizing the granting of proxies.
The New York statute, Section 19 of the General Corporation
Law, provides that "[e]very member of a corporation, except a re-
ligious corporation, entitled to vote at any meeting thereof may vote
by proxy." This is an absolute right and thus requires no permis-
sive by-law to effectuate it.r Under this section, a proxy's authority
lSee Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 319, 119 N. E. 559, 561 (1918).
"'Proxy' has in fact a threefold connotation. It comprehends: (a) the consent
or authorization given by one person to another authorizing the latter to act
for the former; (b) the instrument or paper evidencing such authorization;
and (c) the person authorized to act." PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF CORPORATI NS 456 (2d ed. 1949).2 See Matter of Hart v. Sheridan, 168 Misc. 386, 390, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 820,
824 (Sup. Ct. 1938); see Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 38 n. 1
(1942).
3Without such a form of absentee voting, it would often be very difficult
to obtain .a necessary quorum. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 180 (Rev.
ed. 1946).
4 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 19; see also N. Y. MEmB. CORP. LAW § 41.
5 Matter of Flynn v. Kendall, 195 Misc. 221, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 299 (Sup.
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must be in writing and can last no longer than eleven months unless
a definite period of duration is specified. It may not be issued for
a sum of money or anything of value,6 and any infraction of this rule
constitutes a misdemeanor. 7 However, perceiving that there may be
a dual interest in the corporate stock, failure of the law to allow one
other than the record owner to vote the stock would, under certain
circumstances, be clearly inequitable. The statute therefore allowed
". the parties to a valid pledge or to an executory contract of sale
• . . [to] agree in writing as to which of them shall vote the stock
pledged or sold until the contract of pledge or sale is fully executed." 8
This material interest which may exist in one other than the record
owner is recognized by a provision of the Stock Corporation Law
which states that ". . . the record holder of stock which shall be held
by him as security or which shall actually belong to another, upon
demand therefor and payment of necessary expenses thereof, shall
issue to such pledger or to such actual owner of such stock, a proxy
to vote thereon." 9
The courts have been divided as to the legality of an "irrevocable
proxy." Some courts are of the opinion that irrevocable proxies cre-
ate a suspension of the ordinary rights of ownership, i.e., voting
rights, or restrict the free alienation of the stock, and hence deem
such authorizations to be void as against public policy.' 0 Others,
where a fixed period of duration is involved, disclaim a violation of
public policy." Still others argue that the legislature, in allowing
Ct. 1949). "A non-stock corporation may provide in its by-laws as to proxies
for members, and their duration." N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 19.
6 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 47 (except as expressly authorized by § 47-a,
added by Laws of N. Y. 1953, c. 863).
7 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 668. But see Galibert v. Hoffman, Inc., 120
Misc. 212, 198 N. Y. Supp. 854 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 207 App. Div. 847, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 903 (1st Dep't 1923).8 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 19 (this provision now substantially incorpo-
rated in new § 47-a). "It is well settled that a pledgee of stock, in the absence
of an express agreement, has no right to vote the stock." Fisk Discount Corp.
v. Brooklyn Taxicab Transp. Co., 270 App. Div. 491, 502, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 453,
464 (2d Dep't 1946).
9 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 47 (emphasis added) ; see Matter of Atlantic
City Ambassador Hotel Corp., 62 N. Y. S. 2d 62, 67 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
10 See Sullivan v. Parkes, 69 App. Div. 221, 229, 74 N. Y. Supp. 787, 793
(1st Dep't 1902) (Such an irrevocable power would prevent its free aliena-
tion as it would prevent a subsequent purchaser from exercising one of the
essentials of ownership, i.e., that of voting the stock.). "The right to vote
stock is an essential attribute of the ownership . . . and may not be detracted
from or amended and may not be made irrevocable by proxy. . . ." William
Randall & Sons v. Lucke, 123 Misc. 5, 6, 205 N. Y. Supp. 121, 123 (Sup. Ct.
1924).
"' The case of Brown v. Britton, 41 App. Div. 57, 58 N. Y. Supp. 353
(4th Dep't 1899), involved an agreement to endure for three years to the effect
that: the shareholders were not to sell, transfer or assign any of the stock
without the consent of the other stockholders; if a stockholder wished to dis-
pose of his stock, he was to give preference to the other parties to the agree-
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such an irrevocable grant of voting rights by way of voting trust,
precluded the use of such a proxy for a period longer than ten years.12
Further beclouding this "gray" area of the law,' 3 the term "power
coupled with an interest" 14 found its way into some opinions of this
jurisdiction. An early case construed the applicable statute to pro-
hibit the issuance of a proxy coupled with an interest,15 but it appears
that this determination has not been uniformly accepted.16
Two problems, therefore, presented themselves for solution:
clarification of the law with respect to the legality of irrevocable
proxies and the necessity for some device to cope with the needs of
the ever-expanding sphere of modern corporate activity. These needs,
briefly, are the securing of financial aid quickly without the imposi-
tion of unduly oppressive terms, and managerial competency in in-
stances involving the establishment and maintenance of a sound,
continuous corporate policy while in the process of rebuilding or
reorganization. Irrevocable proxies have been recognized in other
jurisdictions under circumstances similar to these. As in New York,
they have been upheld where accompanied by a pledge1 7 or sale of
the stock.'8 They have also been recognized when given in return
for aid from corporate creditors, 19 and even where the avowed pur-
ment; finally, if one of the stockholders should be unable to vote personally,
he was to give to one of the contracting parties an irrevocable power of attor-
ney to vote the stock. Of such agreements, the court stated: "It is true
that, as a rule, those who havi the largest interests in a corporation are entitled
to control its affairs, and where a combination to effect such a result is entered
into for a fixed, definite and reasonable period of time ... it is not neces-
sarily obnoxious to the rule which condemns as illegal all contracts in restraint
of alienation." Id. at 64, 58 N. Y. Supp. at 357. Cf. Hey v. Dolphin, 92
Hun 230, 36 N. Y. Supp. 627, 631 (Sup. Ct. 1895).12 See Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Ass'n, Inc., 151 Misc. 350, 360,
271 N. Y. Supp. 510, 521 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd mem., 244 App. Div. 876, 281
N. Y. Supp. 680 (4th Dep't 1935).
13 "Upon that question [i.e., as to the validity of an irrevocable proxy for a
fixed period of time] the decisions of the courts are not at all uniform."
Sullivan v. Parkes, supra note 10.
14. ,.. [W]henever a proxy is supported by consideration and given for
a purpose beneficial to the holder rather than merely for the purpose of author-
izing the holder to express the view of the stockholder, then the proxy is coupled
with an interest and irrevocable, even though not expressly declared to be
irrevocable." Comment, 47 MicH. L. REv. 547, 554 (1949). See Note, 159
A. L. R. 307, 308 (1945).
15 Matter of Germicide Co. of New York, 65 Hun 606, 20 N. Y. Supp. 495(1st Dep't 1892); see Matter of Glen Salt Co., 17 App. Div. 234, 244, 45
N. Y. Supp. 568, 574 (3d Dep't), aff'd -men., 153 N. Y. 688, 48 N. E. 1104(1897) ; see SmEvwis, PaivATE CORpoRATiONS 534 (2d ed. 1949).
10 See the discussion of such a power coupled with an interest in Hey v.
Dolphin, 92 Hun 230, 36 N. Y. Supp. 627, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
17 See Deibler v. Chas. H. Elliott Co., 368 Pa. 267, 81 A. 2d 557 (1951).
Is See Groub v. Blish, 88 Ind. App. 309, 152 N. E. 609 (1926).
19 See Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 723 (1893).
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pose was to maintain control of the corporation 20 or to conserve and
carry out a fixed corporate policy.21
Section 47-a of the Stoek Corporation Law
On the strength of the recommendation made by the Law Re-
vision Commission,22 Section 47-a was enacted authorizing the crea-
tion of irrevocable proxies upon compliance with statutory mandates.
The statement of authority must be entitled "irrevocable proxy";
it must state that it is irrevocable; and it must be conferred in writing.
Such a power may be lawfully given in four instances: to ". . . (a) a
pledgee under a valid pledge; (b) a person who has agreed to pur-
chase the stock under an executory contract of sale; (c) a creditor
or creditors of the corporation ... who extend or continue [to extend]
credit to the corporation in consideration of the proxy . . . (d) a per-
son who has contracted to perform services as an officer of the cor-
poration ... if such proxy is required by the contract of employment,
as part of the consideration therefor .... ,, 23 It may be seen that
the first two provisions which were formerly found in the General
Corporation Law,24 and which formed an apparent exception to the
general rule of revocability, have now been embodied in the Stock
Corporation Law and clearly denominated "irrevocable proxy." In
addition to this statutory rearrangement, two new instances have
been added where such a grant of authority may be lawfully given.
If a creditor is to receive the power, the proxy must state that it was
given in consideration for the extension or continuation of credit,25
while a similar proxy given to a prospective officer must state that
it was given in consideration of the contract of employment.26 These
provisions were inserted to eliminate any possible future misunder-
standing concerning the circumstances under which the proxy was
given. A similar statement is not required in the case of a pledgee
or a vendee under an executory contract of sale since it is clear that
the parties, in this situation, would be fully aware of the nature and
import of the transaction.
20 See State v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash. 2d 844, 157 P. 2d 707
(1945).
21 See Ecclestone v. Indialantic, 319 Mich. 248, 29 N. W. 2d 679 (1947);
Chapman v. Bates, 61 N. J. Eq. 658, 47 At. 638 (1900).
22 1953 LzG. Doc. No. 65(G), REPORT, N. Y. LAW RXvSION CoMMIssION
(printed in McKinney's Session Law Service of N. Y., Feb. 25, 1953, No. 2 at
A-86).
23 N. Y. STOcc CoRP. LAW § 47-a(c), (d). These provisions, however, do
not apply to a banking corporation.
24 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 19.
25 N. Y. STocK CORP. LAW § 47-a(c). In addition to this declaration, the
proxy must state ". . . the amount thereof, and the name of the person extend-
ing or continuing [the] credit. .. ."
26Id. §47-a(d). The proxy must also state "... the name of the em-
ployee and the period of employment contracted for."
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Although a statute with a wider scope might perhaps seem prefer-
able, nevertheless, the legislature has wisely avoided employing the
all-inclusive term "proxy coupled with an interest," which several
other jurisdictions have adopted 7 More has been written about
what this power is not than what it actually is.28 Nonetheless, the
four instances where an irrevocable proxy may be lawfully given in
New York basically embody the same concept which underlies a
proxy coupled with an interest. In both situations, the proxy-holder
has an interest in the execution of the authority itself, as opposed
to merely voicing the stockholder's opinion on a particular matter.
As long as the proxy-holder has a pecuniary interest, there is
no necessity for the statutory safeguard of revocability since an abuse
of the authority then becomes a remote possibility. By the same
token, the statute allows this irrevocable period to endure only so
long as this interest persists. Therefore, once the pledge is redeemed,
the executory contract of sale performed, the corporate debt paid, or
the period of employment terminated, the authority becomes revocable
notwithstanding a provision to the contrary. For when the interest
disappears, the law no longer considers the donee a proper person to
exercise an irrevocable right to vote. In the cases involving an ex-
tension of credit to the corporation or an officer's employment con-
tract, the authority also becomes revocable when the period of dura-
tion, if one was specified, has come to an end, or in any case, three
years after the proxy was given, whichever time is the lesser. How-
ever, a new irrevocable proxy may be executed to extend the period.29
The duration of a general proxy as provided for in the General Cor-
poration Law, 0 remains unchanged.
To protect a purchaser of the stock without actual notice after
an irrevocable proxy has been given, the statute declares that the ir-
revocable provision is not enforceable ". . unless notice of the
proxy and its irrevocability appears plainly on the face of the stock
certificate representing the stock on which voting rights are thereby
granted."
Although the specific situations where an irrevocable proxy may
be lawfully given are clear, and no ambiguity exists concerning the
duration of such a proxy, the wording of the statute presents and
leaves unsolved several problems. It has been noted that an irrev-
27Ky. REV. STAT. §271.315 (Baldwin, 1953); MiN. STAT. §301.26(4)
(1949); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.60(d) (1951); WAsH. RFv. CODE § 23.32.080(1952).
28 See Lane Mortg. Co. v. Crenshaw, 93 Cal. App. 411, 269 Pac. 672, 679(1928).
29 This last provision relates to instances where the corporate debt has not
yet been paid or where the period of employment has not come to an end. The
imposition of the maximum period of three years was evidently inserted to
prevent the period of irrevocability from extending over too long a period of
time without renewal.
30N. Y. GEN. Coiu'. LAw § 19 (11 months only, unless otherwise specified).
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ocable proxy may be lawfully given to a corporate creditor or to an
officer under an employment contract, but the stock upon which such
an authority may be given remains undefined.
It is well settled by decisional law that treasury shares may not
be voted by the corporation.31 Therefore any transaction not in-
volving a divestment of corporate title would seem to be ineffectual
to create voting rights on shares so held. Whether this rule, since it
is not a statutory prohibition, should be relaxed to permit a corpora-
tion to issue irrevocable proxies on shares of its own stock held in
the corporate treasury is a question to be seriously considered. How-
ever, such a relaxation might prove a useful tool in the hands of an
unscrupulous few, thereby opening the door to the abuses the rule
was intended to obviate. Assuming, therefore, that there will be no
exception allowing a corporation to issue such proxies on treasury
shares, these shares will continue to be non-voting stock until a trans-
fer of ownership has been effected. A corporation probably will not
be able to grant proxies to creditors or officers on shares once issued
and subsequently reacquired.
It is fundamental that no one has the right to vote authorized
but unissued shares, and a corporation would be precluded from issu-
ing proxies on these. It would seem, therefore, that the stock which
would be available for such a plan would be limited to issued and
outstanding shares, or shares held by the corporation as a stockholder
in another corporation. If it pledges or contracts to sell these shares,
its position is that of pledgor or vendor, and even prior to the enact-
ment of Section 47 -a, it was lawful for the parties to such a transac-
tion to agree in writing as to who could vote the stock.3 2  These
provisions are reiterated in Section 47-a and it was, apparently, not
the intent of the legislature to encompass this situation within the
provision permitting the grant of such a power to corporate creditors.
The inference, then, is compelling that the latter provision was in-
tended to apply only to those cases where a corporation seeks to grant
an irrevocable power on shares of its own stock. The available shares
would then be restricted to those issued and outstanding in the hands
of corporate stockholders.
Proxies could be obtained by agreement between assenting share-
holders and corporate creditors,33 or by corporate solicitation. Solici-
tation of proxies from shareholders has, in the past, been primarily
employed as a means of perpetuating the management in control.34
However, with the enactment of Section 47-a, in the absence of a
stockholder-creditor agreement to give proxies in return for financial
31Vail v. Hamilton, 20 Hun 355 (N. Y. 1880), aff'd, 85 N. Y. 453 (1881) ;
see Swan v. Stiles, 94 App. Div. 117, 124, 87 N. Y. Supp. 1089, 1093 (4th
Dep't 1904).
32 N. Y. GEN. Copp. LAW § 19.
33 See Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 723 (1893).
34 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 180 (Rev. ed. 1946).
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aid, it seems inevitable that corporate solicitation of "irrevocable
proxies" will become an accepted practice. It is to be noted, of
course, that whether or not a shareholder wishes to give such a proxy
is a matter solely within his discretion. Assuming, however, that
the corporation is able to solicit from consenting stockholders the
number of proxies necessary to satisfy its contractual obligations,
there is no statutory limit on the number of proxies which may be
granted to the creditors or officers. Under such circumstances, cor-
porate control previously vested in a stockholder faction may be effec-
tively wrested from it and lodged in a group of "outsiders." It is to
be further noted that here it is not the corporation which is granting
the proxy as prescribed by the statute, but the stockholder.
While answers to the foregoing questions would be merely specu-
lative at this time, it will be necessary to consider them in any future
application of Section 47-a.
Conclusion
An irrevocable proxy should prove to be an effective device in
securing benefits for a corporation which, under normal circum-
stances, it would not receive. It will aid the corporation in secur-
ing financial aid by allowing potential creditors of the corporation an
opportunity to acquire a voice in the corporate management. If they
may exercise some degree of protection over their investment, finan-
cial aid will be more readily forthcoming. Further, a corporation in
financial straits will be better able to bargain for such assistance
rather than merely accept the least oppressive terms available. Con-
tinuity of management and policy, in addition to being more con-
ducive to material gain, are the best means of achieving administrative
harmony within the corporation itself. Therefore, if an employment
contract includes the granting of irrevocable proxies to a potential
corporate officer, it offers an inducement to competent men to accept
managerial positions, since it assures support for a particular and
continuous corporate policy thereby allowing far-sighted planning.
The statutory device may serve as a stabilizing influence on a corpo-
ration which is in the process of rebuilding or reorganizing.
The suggestion has been made that the present-day voting trust
is the result of a need for an irrevocable proxy.3 5 The structure of
the voting trust requires the transfer of legal title to the stock to a
voting trustee, thus consolidating the voting power and thereby effec-
tuating a consistent corporate policy."6 The original owner receives
a certificate from the voting trustee entitling him to an amount equal
35 See Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation, 21 Thx. L.
Rav. 139, 147 (1942).30 See PRAsaxFma, CASES AND MATmuALS ON THE LAvW OF CoPaoRATioNs
462-467 (2d ed. 1949).
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to the dividends declared on the stock so transferred. For all in-
tents and purposes, however, his contractual relations with the cor-
poration have been completely severed. The voting trust has been
employed in instances involving corporate promotion and to guarantee
control to a group of majority stockholders who, for one reason or,
another, prefer the status of voting trust certificate-holder.37 Such
a trust may also form part of the consideration for assistance, finan-
cial or otherwise, rendered to a corporation undergoing a process of
reorganization. However, "[a] voting trust should be regarded like
a dictatorship as a temporary expedient for some special emergency
need." 8 It is submitted that instances where a voting trust is cre-
ated in favor of creditors in return for financial aid may now be
eliminated by substitution of the irrevocable proxy.39 In this way,
an irrevocable grant of voting power could be given, but, at the same
time, one would still retain his status of shareholder with its appur-
tenant privileges such as the right to bring a derivative action,40 the
right to inspect corporate books,41 and the right to a financial state-
ment.42 The maximum period of duration imposed upon a voting
trust, ten years in New York,43 is, of necessity, an arbitrary one.44 On
the other hand, the duration of an irrevocable proxy under this new
section persists only so long as the reason for its creation shall last.
It may be that judicial efforts to liken holders of voting trust cer-
tificates to shareholders have found an answer in the irrevocable
proxy.45 Why can it not be employed in place of the voting trust
where the confessed purpose is the retention of control in order to
insure stability of management and policy?
As seen above, the new section should prove instrumental in
securing benefits for a corporation which it might not ordinarily ob-
tain. However, certain improvements might be made to further pro-
tect the interest of a shareholder who has granted an irrevocable
proxy, and which might be of assistance in facilitating the applica-
tion of this new section. It would seem advisable that a proxy au-
37 See DEWING, THE FINANCIAL PoLIcY OF CORPORATIONs 388-395 (3d
rev. ed. 1934).
38 See Ballantine, supra note 35, at 153.
39 See N. Y. STocK CORP. LAW § 47-a(c).40 N. Y. GEN. Coap. LAW § 61.
41 N. Y. STocx Coap. LAW § 10.42 Id. § 77.
43 Id. § 50 ("A stockholder, by agreement in writing, may transfer his stock
to a voting trustee or trustees for the purpose of conferring the right to vote
thereon for a period not exceeding ten years upon the terms and conditions
therein stated.").
44 See Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regidatioi, 21 TEx. L.
Rv. 139, 164 (1942).
4-5 See Comment, 36 CALIF. L. RE v. 281, 286 (1948). It has also been sug-
gested that the substitution of the voting trust with the irrevocable proxy
would effect a saving of transfer taxes incidental to the creation and termina-
tion of voting trusts. See BALLANTINE, CORPOPATIONS § 184b (Rev. ed. 1946).
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thorization should be required to state specifically what the representa-
tive may or may not do. If the power is a general one enabling him
to vote only on ordinary corporate matters, it should so state. No
power to vote for a sale of corporate assets, a dissolution or similar
acts of extraordinary import can be implied from such a power.4 6
If the proxy-holder is to have authority to vote on such matters, this
too should be clearly stated to avoid the possibility of subsequent
confusion or uncertainty as to the scope of his authority. The proxy
statement along with a description of the representative's power
should then be filed with the corporation and the limitations im-
posed by the stockholder could be made binding on the corporation.
This would obviate the injustice of binding stockholders by unauthor-
ized acts of their proxy. 7 There should be a provision for the re-
moval of the proxy-holder as a consequence of any abuse of the li-
cense so conferred. Though it may not be seriously questioned that
a shareholder could obtain relief under such circumstances, a quick,
efficient method for the removal of the cause of the abuse would ap-
pear desirable.
As previously noted, corporate solicitation of "irrevocable
proxies" from shareholders seems inevitable by reason of the enact-
ment of Section 47-a. Whether this solicitation is for the benefit of
corporate creditors or officers, the corporation will, in most instances,
derive a benefit therefrom. Consequently, a shareholder who is re-
quested to voluntarily grant such an authority should do so only if
the corporation supplies him with information sufficient to enable him
to determine whether or not to relinquish his voting rights. It is
submitted that the request should contain information concerning the
status of the parties in relation to one another; a brief account of
the agreement which requires the granting of such a proxy; the con-
sideration for the undertaking and the purposes to be accomplished;
the duration of the authority; and finally, the interests to be sur-
rendered, the rights to be acquired and the consequences thereof. 48
Once the shareholder has granted such a power, it should be incum-
bent on the corporation to notify him when the debt has been repaid
or the period of employment has terminated so that he may act
accordingly. He may then permit the authority to continue subject
46See Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 584, aff'd, 33
Barb. 586 (N. Y. 1861).
47 See Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MicH. L. Rav. 225, 253 (1942).
48 In too many instances involving managerial solicitation of proxies, the
stockholder was sent a proxy card inviting him to sign his name and return
the card without being furnished the information essential to an intelligent
exercise of the right to vote. See Loss, SECURI~r.s REGULATION 521 (1951).
An excellent model regarding the solicitation of proxies and the information
required to be furnished may be found under the rules of the Securities Ex-
change Commission. See 17 CODE FED. Rwas. §§ 2 40.14a-1 to 240.14a-10, Sched.
14A (Supp. 1952).
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to revocation,49 or he may desire to withdraw it altogether. In the
alternative, there could be a provision automatically terminating such
authority upon the termination of the cause for its creation. The
onus, however, should not be on the shareholder alone to revoke the
authority at the risk of a possible injury to his interests by an
unauthorized act.
LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF THE DIVISIBLE DIVORCE-NEW
PROTECTION FOR THE STAY-AT-HOmE SPoUsE
Immediately upon the performance of the marriage ceremony,
the husband by law, morals, and usage takes upon himself the re-
sponsibility of supporting his wife.1 This duty arises notwithstand-
ing the personal income or wealth of the wife or her ability to provide
for herself and her family,2 and continues until terminated by either
the death of one of the parties,3 or the cessation of the marital rela-
tionship by legal decree without provision for support.4 Thus if the
court did not exercise its discretionary power to award support in
49N. Y. STocK CORP. LAw §47-a(c), (d) (". . . [T]he proxy becomes
revocable after the pledge is redeemed . . . the executory contract of sale...
performed . . . the debt of the corporation . . . paid or [when] the period of
employment . . . has terminated .... ).
IN. Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 51; see Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296,
299, 26 N. E. 2d 265, 266 (1940); Oberlander v. Oberlander, 179 Misc. 459,
467, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 139, 146 (N. Y. Dona. Rel. Ct. 1943); see GRossMAN,
NEw YORK LAW OF DOMESTIc RmATIONS 88 (1947); 41 C. J. S. 404.
2 DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722 (1911); see
Clark v. Clark, 203 Cal. 414, 264 Pac. 761 (1928); Davis v. Davis, 65 Cal.
App. 499, 224 Pac. 478, 479 (1924); Shebley v. Peters, 53 Cal. App. 288,
200 Pac. 364, 366 (1921) ; Rich v. Rich, 12 N. J. Misc. 310, 171 Atl. 515, 519
(1934); Coleman v. Coleman, 37 Ohio App. 474, 175 N. E. 38, 39 (1930);
Matter of Harper, 288 Pa. 52, 135 Atl. 617, 618 (1927); Mihalcoe v. Holub,
130 Va. 425, 107 S. E. 704, 706 (1921).
3 See Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N. Y. 408, 410-412, 75 N. E. 236, 237-238
(1905); Barnes v. Klug, 129 App. Div. 192, 195, 113 N. Y. Supp. 325, 328
(st Dep't 1908).
4 Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 Ati. 605 (1936); accord, Lynn v.
Lynn, 302 N. Y. 193, 97 N. E. 2d 748 (1951); see McCoy v. McCoy, 191
Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377, 378 (1921); Eldred v. Eldred, 62 Neb. 613, 87
N. W. 340, 341 (1901); People v. Schenkel, 258 N. Y. 224, 226, 179 N. E.
474, 475 (1932). "Unless otherwise provided by local law, a decree of divorce
by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, dissolving the
bonds of matrimony puts an end to all obligations of either party to the other,
and to any right which either has acquired by the marriage . . . except so
far as the court granting the divorce, in the exercise of an authority vested in
it by the legislature, orders . . . alimony to be paid by one party to the
other." Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 523, 524-525 (1884).
[ VOL. 28
